Towards an international emissions trading scheme: Legal specification of tradeable emissions entitlements by Johnson, Hope et al.
1 
 
Towards an International Emissions Trading Scheme: Legal 
Specification of Tradeable Emissions Entitlements* 
The Paris Agreement reaffirmed the role of emissions trading as an important policy 
tool for mitigating climate change. Equally, emissions trading schemes (ETSs) are 
increasingly being developed and inter-linked. Despite these developments, no 
agreement has been reached regarding the legal character of what is being traded. 
Generally, ETSs involve tradeable statutory entitlements that take the form of 
emission allowances or carbon credits. Legal uncertainty surrounds whether 
emission entitlements are capable of constituting property, and if so what rights, 
corresponding duties and liabilities they confer on holders. In this article, we argue 
that the legal character of emissions entitlements can influence the functioning of 
emissions markets, which has ramifications for achieving the environmental goals of 
ETSs. We identify the methods legislatures could adopt to characterise emission 
entitlements, and evaluate limitations of the current approaches. To conclude, we 
explore how top-down, international standards could harmonise and clarify the legal 
nature of emission entitlements.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The collapse of confidence in the trade in securitised sub-prime mortgages sparked the Global 
Financial Crisis and revealed the significant problems that arise where the character of what is 
being traded is inadequately regulated and poorly understood.1 The lessons of this experience 
have yet to be applied to state-based emissions trading schemes (ETSs), which generally fail 
to specify the nature or scope of the permits or credits (‘emission entitlements’) which are the 
objects of trade. Some jurisdictions characterise emission entitlements as administrative 
concessions. Others characterise them as personal property.  In fact, emission entitlements 
exhibit characterisations of both private property and regulatory instruments, while at the 
same time representing a unique legal fiction and a valuable commodity.  
 
The need to address gaps in emissions trading schemes (ETSs) has heightened with the recent 
conclusion of the Paris Agreement by state parties to the United Nations Framework 
Agreement on Climate Change.2 The support for market-based mechanisms in the Paris 
Agreement, and in particular its development of “internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes”, affirms the crucial role of ETSs in mitigating climate change.3 According to 
article 6 of the Agreement, parties can use and transfer “mitigation outcomes” to meet their 
emission reduction targets. Close to half of all state parties declared they will use or consider 
using an ETS to meet their emission reduction targets.4 The Paris Agreement lays the 
groundwork for an international ETS by establishing the “sustainable development 
mechanism”. While the specific rules, modalities and procedures for this mechanism are 
unsettled, the mechanism will enable the transfer of emission reductions with the goal of, 
inter alia, incentivising and facilitating ‘[p]articipation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions by public and private entities’.5   
 
The Paris Agreement signals to states and investors the importance of developing, inter-
linking and scaling up emissions trading frameworks in preparation for tradeable 
“internationally transferable mitigation outcomes” through the sustainable development 
mechanism.  Meanwhile, the ad hoc development of ETSs to date provides opportunities and 
challenges as countries move towards more integrated and international emissions markets.6  
In this context of a potentially emerging global ETS and increasingly inter-linked ETSs, 
Button observed ‘[i]t is important for governments to seek consensus as to the legal 
                                                            
1 See, eg, Eric Helleiner, ‘Understanding the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars 
of International Political Economy’ (2011) 14(1) Annual Review of Political Science 67. 
2 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 21st sess, Agenda item 4(b), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (12 
December 2015) annex (Paris Agreement) art 6.  
3 Article 6(4) states that ‘A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and 
support sustainable development is hereby established’.  Parties to the Paris Agreement decided  in art 
6(7) that the ‘rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism’ will be adopted at the next meeting 
of the parties.  
4 ‘Emissions Trading Worldwide’ (Status Report, International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), 
2016) 25 
<https://icapcarbonaction.com/images/StatusReport2016/ICAP_Status_Report_2016_Online.pdf>. 
5 Paris Agreement art 6(4)(b).  
6 Stefan E Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design: A Critical Overview (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 
191; See also, Jonas Meckling, ‘The Future of Emissions Trading’ (2014) 5(5) Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Climate Change 569; Joseph Kruger, Wallace E Oates and William A Pizer, 
‘Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy’ (Discussion 
Paper, Resources for the Future, 2007) 
<http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-07-02.pdf>; Andreas Tuerk et al, 
‘To Link or Not to Link: Benefits and Disadvantages of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems’ (2009) 9(4) 
Climate Policy 352–354; A Denny Ellerman, ‘A Note on Tradeable Permits’ 31(2) Environmental and 
Resource Economics 123, 1. 
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characteristics of the basic unit of exchange in this market, and the related issue of which 
market model to adopt. So far, it appears that this matter has not been addressed’.7 
Consistently with Button’s observation, this article focuses on how states have legally 
characterised emission entitlements, an issue that represents a challenge and an opportunity 
for increasing the scale and effectiveness of ETSs. Excluded from our consideration are those 
ETSs administrated by non-state actors, as these schemes generally do not provide 
information regarding the legal nature of entitlements.  
 
We begin our analysis with a brief overview of emissions trading and the nature of the legal 
rights that a person could hold in relation to emission entitlements. Next, we identify and 
analyse the current approaches adopted by states to characterise emission entitlements. After 
exploring the gaps and inconsistencies in the current approaches, we then consider the private 
law issues and modes of dealing with an emission entitlement that could arise and which are 
not resolvable through contract law. This analysis draws on case law from common law 
countries concerning other types of tradeable entitlements like fishing licences. Finally, we 
recommend that the international emissions trading mechanism, established under article 6(4) 
of the Paris Agreement, encompass general standards for states when clarifying the scope and 
nature of rights granted to holders of an emission units. To this end, we examine international 
agreements and mechanisms, which seek to harmonise how domestic legal systems specify 
rights in a particular asset, as potential models for future developments in ETSs. 
I. BACKGROUND  
Role of Emission Entitlements 
 
Governments have increasingly legislated to establish tradable rights in natural resources to 
promote more sustainable and productive use of scarce resources.  For instance, governments 
have sought to achieve the sustainable use of fish stocks by obligating fisheries to obtain 
licences to fish. The term “statutory entitlement” succinctly describes those bundles of rights 
that a regulator allocates or transfers under a statutory scheme. The class includes emission 
entitlements along with, for instance, fishing licences, mining permits and water access 
entitlements.  
 
Emission entitlements are generated through ETSs of which there are two models: baseline-
and-credit or cap-and-trade. An ETS that adopts a baseline-and-credit model generates 
emission entitlements when an entity develops an offset project, such as installing low-energy 
technology, which reduces emissions in comparison to an established benchmark. Under this 
model, the emission entitlement represents a tradeable right to claim credit for an abatement, 
even if there is no legal restriction on the holder’s emissions.  
 
A cap-and-trade scheme involves a regulator allocating emission entitlements to entities, 
which grant the right to emit in a volume equal to a pre-determined maximum level of 
allowable to emissions. Each time an entity uses an emission entitlement on its own 
emissions, it misses the opportunity to sell the entitlement. If a party exceeds its allocated 
emission entitlements, they must purchase more allowances from other parties in order to 
acquit their liability. Under this model, an emission entitlement represents ‘a transferable right 
to emit a substance that can create pollution’.8   
 
In both models, participants are incentivised to reduce its emissions through the financial and 
reputational benefits of generating and selling entitlements. This approach to incentivising 
                                                            
7 Jillian Button, ‘Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market 
Based on the Currency Model’ (2008) 32(2) Harvard Environmental Law Review 571, 572. 
8 Ellerman, above n 6, 124. 
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emission reductions is based on neoclassical economic theories that position the market as the 
most efficient way to distribute the burden of reducing emissions.9 Theoretically, a scheme 
that distributes emission entitlements will incentivise those actors that can reduce emissions at 
the lowest cost to do so as they will be able to sell the entitlements generated; while those 
actors who struggle to reduce emissions can purchase allowances to avoid tax penalties or as 
part of their corporate social responsibility.10 By allocating particular rights (such as the right 
to emit) in a particular medium (i.e. the air), stakeholders can negotiate their own solution to 
the negative impacts of greenhouse gas emissions in a notionally more efficient manner than 
if a tax were imposed on polluting parties.11 
 
Because a functioning market depends on the transferability of well-defined rights for an 
expressed price, the differing and unclear conceptions underpinning emission entitlements has 
the potential to affect the functioning of emissions trading markets. Consequently, the nature 
of emission entitlements can influence how well ETSs meet their shared objective of 
efficiently reduce emissions.12 As Manea observes: ‘certainty in the understanding of 
entitlements is a recognised prerequisite for a viable market, and well-delineated property 
rights are considered fundamental to market exchange’.13   
 
In addition to undermining the policy rationale for ETSs, the lack of a harmonised approach 
to defining emission entitlements is recognised as a key barrier to inter-linking and scaling up 
ETSs.14 Inter-linking is important because expanding ETSs improves the functioning and 
viability of markets by increasing participants and improving price signals.  To inter-link 
ETSs, a regulator must accept the use of an emission allowance originating from another 
jurisdiction.15 Therefore, the differing conceptions of the rights and duties that attach to an 
emission entitlement will affect the feasibility of inter-linking.  
 
Overview of Rights and Emission Entitlements  
 
                                                            
9 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
10 Alfred Endres, Environmental Economics: Theory and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
32–33. See also Philip E Graves, Environmental Economics: A Critique of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007) 76–77. 
11 Coase, above n 10. Limitations to Coase theorem include that it relies on the non-existence of 
transaction costs (e.g. search, bargaining and verification costs) and other market imperfections. Coase 
acknowledged that sometimes government intervention is necessary to improve economic efficiency 
particularly where ‘a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling 
the problem through the market or firm may be high’ at 18.  See also, Jeffrey M Perloff, 
Microeconomics (Addison-Wesley, 2001) 675. Where transaction costs are high, the allocation of 
property rights will impact upon emission levels.  
12 See, eg, Sabina Manea, ‘Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions 
Trading System’ (2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law 303. 
13Sabina Manea, Instrumentalising Property: An Analysis of Rights in the EU Emissions Trading 
System (Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Law of the London School of Economics, 2013) 23 
<http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/719/1/Manea_Instrumentalising_property_2013.pdf>. 
14 ‘Emissions Trading Schemes and Their Linking - Challenges and Opportunities in Asia and the 
Pacific’ (Asian Development Bank, 2016) 16 
<http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/182501/emissions-trading-schemes.pdf>; Wolfgang 
Sterk et al, ‘Joint Emissions Trading as a Socio-Ecological Transformation’ (Working Paper 1/06, 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, July 2006) 56 
<http://wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wupperinst/JETSET_WP_1-06.pdf>. 
15 Anita Talberg and Kai Swoboda, ‘Emissions Trading Schemes around the World’ (Background 
Note, Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, 6 June 2013) 3 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/2501441/upload_binary/2501441.pdf;file
Type=application/pdf>. 
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The legal character of rights in relation to emission entitlements determines two issues. First, 
the legal characterisation can affect whether, under a state’s constitutional and legal 
provisions, a holder can bring a claim against the government for interfering with their 
property rights in the entitlement. Secondly, the legal character of a statutory entitlement 
determines the rights an entitlement holder can exercise against or for third parties in relation 
to the entitlement.16  
 
Civil and common law legal systems characterise rights as either proprietary (rights in rem) or 
contractual rights (rights in personam).17  Interests in an entitlement, therefore, are likely to be 
contractual or proprietary in nature depending on the underlying methodological approach.18   
 
Rights in an emission entitlement can be characterised as in personam if they bind only 
specific people with whom the holder has a relationship. For instance, where someone has 
purchased an emission entitlement from a holder (‘the buyer’), but the entitlement is not 
transferred, the buyer of the entitlement can bring a claim against the entitlement’s holder for 
a breach of contract seeking remedies. These remedies vary, but generally, breaches of in 
personam or contractual rights are characterised as ‘pure economic losses.19 In personam 
rights to an entitlement are determinative where disputes arise between a buyer and seller, but 
they do not clarify the legal relationship with the government or with third parties in relation 
to the entitlement.  
 
Alternatively, rights in an entitlement could be characterised as rights in rem, that is, 
proprietary, if they attach to the entitlement and are enforceable by the holder against 
strangers, regardless of whether they have knowledge of the entitlement and its holder or 
not.20  As opposed to merely in personam contractual rights, the holder of property rights will 
have stronger forms of protection in relation to the asset itself that are exercisable against 
anyone who interferes with the exercise of the property right.  
 
For instance, a person with property rights in an asset can claim a right to recover the property 
or damages for its loss. Depending on the jurisdiction, actions such as detinue or conversion 
may form the basis for asserting a proprietary claim. In common law jurisdictions, holders of 
such rights may trace their property rights in equity even where the original asset has been 
converted or mixed with someone else’s property.  
 
There is no single test that will identify rights as in rem or in personam. Moses observed 
‘Reasons offered for or against treating each thing as property are usually ad hoc - there is no 
                                                            
16 As identified by Mathew Storey, ‘Not of This Earth: The Extraterrestrial Nature of Statutory 
Property in the 21st Century’ (2006) 25 Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 51, 51. 
17 See, eg, Max Radin, ‘Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law’ (1925) 13(3) California Law 
Review 207. The “bundle of rights” view has been criticised for being indeterminate and for diluting 
the distinction between property and other rights. Key critiques include JE Penner, ‘Bundle of Rights 
Picture of Property, The’ (1995) 43 UCLA Law Review 711; Thomas C Grey, Formalism and 
Pragmatism in American Law (BRILL, 2014). 
18 This is a conceptualist understanding of property.  For more information on the contested approaches 
to understanding property, see Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘A Theory of Property’ 
(2005) 90 Cornell Law Review 531. 
19 Example developed from, Peter Birks and Eric Descheemaeker, The Roman Law of Obligations 
(Oxford University Press, 2014) 13–14. Specific performance is a discretionary remedy and is 
generally available where damages would be inadequate to address the breach. See, John Carter, 
LexisNexis, Carter on Contracts, vol 2 (at Service 43) [45-001]. Shavell suggests that where a person 
is transferring goods to another, parties are likely to favour specific performance for a breach of 
contract rather than damages. Steven Shavell, ‘Specific Performance versus Damages for Breach of 
Contract: An Economic Analysis’ (2005) 84 Texas Law Review 831. 
20 See, eg, David Lametti, ‘The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth’ 
(2003) 53 University of Toronto Law Journal 325. 
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single set of tests or considerations offered for deciding whether a thing ought to be treated as 
an object of property that can be applied across contexts’.21 Instead, courts and scholars have 
employed various criteria to determine whether an object is capable of supporting proprietary 
interests.  
 
One test that has been employed in common law countries comes from  National Provincial 
Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, and in particular the statement from Lord Wilberforce 
that:   
 
Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of property, or of a 
right affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in 
its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or 
stability. 
 
In applying this broad test to an emission entitlement, we can see it is likely to satisfy the 
criteria if the entitlement has a way of being identified such as by a registration number.22 A 
registration number ensures that an emission entitlement is identifiable by third parties and 
makes an entitlement capable of being assumed by another even if transfers are not permitted 
by the statutory scheme.23   
 
However, if an ETS is designed so that emission entitlements are only transferable to the state 
to acquit the liability of the designated holder under the regulatory scheme, the entitlement 
lacks an essential aspect of property under the Ainsworth test, namely the capacity to be 
assumed by third parties. Likewise, the extent to which emission entitlements are liable to 
cancellation by the regulator can affect its permanency or stability.24 
 
Although useful for illustrating some of the key considerations when determining whether a 
proprietary interest can exist in relation to an asset, the Ainsworth test and others like it are 
not conclusive.25 Instead, as Samuel observed, much will depend on ‘the relations and notions 
that flow between people, things and actions’ when determining whether something is 
property or not.26 In other words, property is a social construct, and so context and policy 
considerations shape the existence of property rights. Furthermore, the methodologies 
employed to determine the legal character of rights to an asset can lead to significantly 
different characterisations. For example, US courts place significant weight on whether the 
entitlement encompasses a right to use, to exclude and to transfer,27 while Australian courts 
                                                            
21 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘The Applicability of Property Law in New Contexts: From Cells to 
Cyberspace.’ (2008) 30(4) Sydney Law Review, The 639, 641. 
22 This test was applied to emission entitlements in Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd  
[2012] EWHC 10 (Ch) [50]. 
23 Australian Capital Territory v Pinter (2002) 121 FCR 509. 
24 ICM Agriculture (2009) 240 CLR 140, 178–9 [75]–[79] where the High Court of Australia 
considered the permanency and stability test in relation to a licence. See in particular, Heydon J’s 
judgement at [205].    
25 For instance, The High Court of Australia commented in Zhu v Treasurer of the State of New South 
Wales [2004] HCA 56; (2004) 218 CLR 530, 577, ‘"Property" is a comprehensive term which is used 
in the law to describe many different kinds of relationship between a person and a subject-matter; the 
term is employed to describe a range of legal and equitable estates and interests, corporeal and 
incorporeal. Accordingly, to characterise something as a proprietary right (and, a fortiori, a quasi-
proprietary right) is not to say that it has all the indicia of other things called proprietary rights. Nor is it 
to say "how far or against what sort of invasions the [right] shall be protected, because the protection 
given to property rights varies with the nature of the right’. 
26 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Property Notions in the Law of Obligations’ (1994) 53(3) The Cambridge Law 
Journal 524, 544. 
27 Peanut Quota Holders Association Inc v United States (‘Peanut Quota Holders’) 421 F 3d 1323, 
1331 [6] (Fed Cir, 2005).  
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consider, among other things, whether an entitlement is capable ‘in its nature’ of being 
assumed by a third-party, not whether it is legally transferable.28  
 
Even where emission entitlements satisfy a legal test for being capable of supporting 
proprietary interests, the existence of particular rights, liberties, immunities and powers will 
still need to be identified. One way to determine the nature and scope of the proprietary rights 
and liabilities in relation to an object is to consider whether the asset falls within established 
categories of property. 
 
To begin, personal property rights can be characterised by whether they relate to tangible 
(choses in possession) or intangible (choses in action) assets. Emission entitlements in their 
tangible form may be represented by a physical title, which could then be subject to, for 
example, claims for return of the title.29 Yet emission entitlements generally only exist on 
electronic registers, as the table in Part II of this article illustrates. Because of this 
representational form, emission entitlements are more akin to intangible property, which 
exists in two categories: choses in actions and an unspecified category of “other forms of 
intangible property”.  
 
Choses in action are those property rights that a person can only enforce through a legal claim 
not by taking physical possession.30 Put differently, a chose in action provides the holder with 
a right to pursue an action for possession. More recently, choses in action have extended from 
rights to bring a legal action to include  ‘the documents, such as bonds, which evidenced or 
proved the existence of such rights of action’ and finally to encompass statutorily created 
property rights to incorporeal property such as intellectual property.31  
 
A persuasive argument can be made for emission entitlements being classed as choses in 
action, given the similarities between emission entitlements and other forms of intangible 
property such as shares or debts. Like shares in a company, emission entitlements tend to be 
held in accounts, have no physical existence but are recognised in law, and are ‘government-
sanctioned units of exchange’.32 Similarly, legal scholars have drawn an analogy between 
emission entitlements and debts, both of which are only enforceable against particular actors 
not the world at large.33 However, it is also arguable that emission entitlements are not choses 
in action because they are effectively a permit to emit, not a legal right to take particular legal 
action.34 Perhaps then, emission entitlements are some other form of intangible property. 
 
Regardless of whether emission entitlements are considered choses in action or some other 
form of intangible property, the ways in which emission entitlements are categorised will only 
be indicative of the kinds of rights that may exist. The rights capable of existing in relation to 
an entitlement will vary depending on the particular asset and the institutional context.  
For instance, shares encompass a range of rights from the right to receive dividends through 
to a right to vote. Accordingly, if the rights under emission entitlements were choses in action 
or some other form of intangible property, the particular rights that the entitlement confers 
would require further specification.   
 
                                                            
28 Australian Capital Territory v Pinter (2002) 121 FCR 509, 529 [86]-[90]. 
29 Note Documentary intangible  
30 Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49, 65 per Macfarlan; Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427, 430 per 
Channell J; 
31 WS Holdsworth, ‘The History of the Treatment of “Choses” in Action by the Common Law’ (1920) 
33(8) Harvard Law Review 997, 998. 
32 Button, above n 7, 578. 
33 Kelvin FK Low and Jolene Lin, ‘Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, 
TragiCO2medy?’ (2015) 27(3) Journal of Environmental Law 1, 14. 
34 This argument was made in Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd  [2012] EWHC 10 
(Ch)[60]-[61].  
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Under intellectual property law, for instance, the rights that make up “ownership” of an 
innovation or artwork are outlined in the statute that established the intellectual property 
rights in the first instance. For instance, the nature of copyright in original works is outlined in 
Australia’s Copyright Act 1968 s 31, and includes the exclusive right to publish the work and 
to reproduce it in material form.  The way in which intellectual property regimes have 
characterised rights is a particularly useful model for emissions trading as both involve the 
creation of private interests, in often intangible products, for the purposes of achieving public 
policy goals.   
II. Methods of Implementing a Specification Regime  
 
Even if the rights a holder has in an emission entitlements do not amount to property, and 
therefore not exercisable against the world at large, legislatures must consider the scope and 
nature of the interests capable of existing in relation to an entitlement because they are a 
subject of market trade. The case of Ormet Primary Aluminium Corp v Ohio Power Co 
illustrates the need to specify the nature of such an entitlement.  
 
Ormet, an aluminium manufacturer, claimed a proprietary interest in the emission allowances 
granted to Ohio Power Company by the US government under its acid rain program.35 The 
case centred on whether, as Ormet contended, the claim should be treated as a private cause of 
action or, as Ohio Power Co argued, the subject matter of the case is federal and so should be 
heard by a federal court. In spite of the relevant statute stating that an allowance granted 
under the acid rain program ‘does not constitute a property right’, the Court observed: 
 
The Act provides that these emission allowances may be bought and sold as any other 
commodity…In establishing a system of marketable allowances, the Act creates proprietary 
interests in emission allowances and provides for their transferability…We believe it clear that 
Congress intended that disagreements over the allocation of allowances be resolved by 
existing methods of dispute resolution within the framework of existing commercial 
relationships.36  
 
Accordingly, the Court was not willing to declare the allowances to be property as this would 
be contrary to an express legislative provision, but it did characterise the matter as a private 
dispute concerning ownership.37  
 
This case illustrates that, when the government distributes a tradeable asset intending for 
secondary distribution via the market, participants will interpret and transfer the entitlements 
in a similar manner to other more conventional assets.38 So to create legal certainty, 
consistency and transparency, legislatures need to consider how market actors will deal with 
entitlements and what kinds of transfers and interests are preferable from a public policy 
perspective. In particular, drafters of an ETS should consider: the rights and corresponding 
duties that attach to such instruments, the potential violations of such rights or duties by third-
parties to a transaction, the ways in which such rights can be divided and transferred and how 
other domestic laws should interact with the type of entitlement.39  
                                                            
35 Ormet argued that it had a contractual arrangement to pay a share of one of Ohio Power Company’s 
factory’s operating and maintenance costs in return for emission allowances which Ormet claimed 
where worth US$40 million. 
36 Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F. 3d 799, ( 4th Cir, 1996) 802, 805-6.  
37 As also observed in, Markus W Gehring and Charlotte Streck, ‘Emissions Trading: Lessons From 
SOx and NOx Emissions Allowance and Credit Systems Legal Nature, Title, Transfer, and Taxation of 
Emission Allowances and Credits’ (2005) 35 Environmental Law Reporter 10219, 10223. 
38 Ibid 10224. 
39 Pamela O’Connor, ‘Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The Problem of 
Measurement Costs’ (2013) 39(1) Monash University Law Review 38, 52. 
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We suggest that a legislature has four main, but not mutually exclusive, methods for 
determining and specifying the character of emission entitlements. In fact, coordination 
between the methods adopted for specification could more effectively specify rights and 
liabilities than one approach alone.  
 
The first approach is to equate emission entitlements to an existing category of property, for 
instance, choses in action or a profits-à-prendre.  The benefit of this approach is that some of 
the statutory rules that apply to intangible property are made applicable to emission 
entitlements such as rules of succession. At the same time, the distinct nature of emission 
entitlements, discussed in the previous section, mean that the scope and nature of the rights 
will still need to be clarified by legislative instruments.  
 
Secondly, the legislature could leave most or all of the characterisation of emission 
entitlements to courts to decide as issues arise between private parties. This method is less 
likely to foster legal certainty and consistency, especially in civil law countries, as it only 
resolves the dispute between the parties not the broader uncertainties regarding the interests 
capable of being held in an entitlement. In fact, not specifying the nature of tradeable 
entitlements leads to difficult situations where courts must affirm or revoke arms-length, 
commercial dealings with entitlements of significant values.40  
 
Thirdly, the legislature could create a comprehensive statutory specification scheme that 
expressly outlines the particular rights and obligations that an entitlement grants to the holder. 
This could take a form similar to intellectual property statutes where the rights and limits to 
these rights in relation to a particular innovation are specified in detail. Alternatively, the 
statutory scheme may be less detailed regarding rights and obligations, but impose minimum 
standards via the implication of statutory guarantees and warranties in contracts for the 
transfer of emission entitlements.  
 
Some property theorists consider it preferable to verify through statute the rights that make up 
a statutory entitlement, as this method allows the rights and obligations to be tailor-made to 
suit the particular context and entitlement.41 Furthermore, legislated rules are often more 
accessible and visible, which facilitates legal certainty and market confidence.42  Hepburn has 
convincingly argued for such an approach in relation to forestry carbon sequestration rights, 
that is, the rights attainable in relation to trees and carbon they contain, which attach to the 
land but do not involve ‘the transfer of full corporeal ownership of land’.43 She explored how 
characterising entitlements by analogy to other pre-existing categories of property is 
inadequate because, unlike interests in land which are standardised, carbon rights create novel 
relationships and are designed to be easily exchangeable. Hepburn concludes that:  
 
The flexibility and focus underpinning statutory verification encourages 
particularisation and detail in the formalisation of carbon rights…Statutory 
verification is also better equipped to respond to the intrinsic diversity of carbon 
rights.44   
 
Put differently, where an asset is unique, delineating specific rights and liabilities is a more 
appropriate because it allows for a customisable approach than determining rights by analogy.  
                                                            
40 See, eg, Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd  [2012] EWHC 10.  
41 Samantha Hepburn, ‘Carbon Rights as New Property: The Benefits of Statutory Verification’ (2009) 
31 Sydney Law Review 239. 
42 Henry Edward Smith and Thomas Merrill, ‘Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1, 62. 
43 Hepburn, above n 42, 247. 
44 Ibid 270. 
10 
 
 
 
Lastly, the legislature could incorporate into its regulatory scheme contractually based trading 
rules and regulations that apply to participants in an emission entitlement exchange. The rules 
could apply to market participants, market operators and the emission entitlements 
themselves, and address activities such as price manipulation and fraud.  
 
The benefit of focusing on trading rules as a way to regulate legal interests in entitlements is 
that the method avoids separating the regulation of emission entitlements from the regulation 
of derivative financial products in the entitlements. Lessons can be learned from failings in 
the pre-Global Financial Crisis regulation of the US mortgage market, which was divided 
between primary and secondary markets. This division lead to a lack of coordination and 
information sharing between the respective regulators. The fragmentation led to a lack of 
effective oversight, which contributed to the asset bubble.45 
 
Similar fragmentation can be seen in markets for emission entitlements where various 
financial derivative instruments (forwards, options, futures, swaps) have been traded and 
regulated separately from ETSs.46 For example, Chan explored how regulatory coordination is 
needed in relation to emission markets; otherwise similar dynamics that led to financial crisis 
‘will likely play out in the project, primary and secondary carbon markets’.47  
 
Despite promoting regulatory coordination, the scope and nature of the rights as they affect 
non-registered traders would still need to be determined. As a result, amending trading rules 
and securities regulations to clarify the scope and nature of legal interests in emission 
entitlements should form only part of the approach adopted by legislatures to characterisation.  
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO CHARACTERISING EMISSION ENTITLEMENTS IN 
COMPLIANCE MARKETS   
 
We examined the legislative instruments that established 16 of the 17 ETSs that are in force 
as well as several ETSs that are under consideration or are schedule for implementation and 
which have available drafts.48  In total, we considered 23 ETSs with China representing seven 
of these as China has a number of regional, pilot ETSs in force. 
 
Of these 23 ETSs, 21 defined emission entitlements in relation to their objective features as 
opposed to the legal relationships they are capable of supporting.49 Commonly, definitions 
stated that emission entitlements were “tradeable units” equivalent to a particular amount of 
                                                            
45 See, eg, Guido Ferrarini and Filippo Chiodini, ‘Nationally Fragmented Supervision over 
Multinational Banks as a Source of Global Systemic Risk: A Critical Analysis of Recent EU Reforms’ 
in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A 
post-crisis analysis (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
46 See, eg, Philippe Descheneau and Matthew Paterson, ‘Between Desire and Routine: Assembling 
Environment and Finance in Carbon Markets’ (2011) 43(3) Antipode 662. 
47 Michelle Chan, ‘Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis: Designing Carbon Markets for 
Environmental Effectiveness and Financial Stability Thematic Focus: Carbon Finance and Investment’ 
(2009) 2009 Carbon & Climate Law Review 152, 155. 
48 We adopted the ‘Emissions Trading Worldwide’, above n 4, 20. Saitama’s ETS and Ukraine’s ETS 
were left out of our analysis due to a lack of translated, official information. See, eg, Saitama 
Prefecture Global Warming Strategy Promotion Ordinance 2009. 
49 Greenhouse Gas Industrial Reporting and Control Act B.C. Reg 247/2015; Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Control Regulation BC Reg 250/2015 (British-Columbia); The Climate Change and 
Emissions Reductions Act, C.C.S.M. c. C135, § 6(2) (2013) (Manitoba). 
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greenhouse gases, generally carbon.50 For instance, under the New Zealand ETS, an emission 
reduction unit means: 
 
a unit derived from a joint implementation project, issued by converting an assigned 
amount unit or removal unit, and designated as an emission reduction unit by—(a) the 
[NZ] Registry; or (b) an overseas registry of a Party listed in Annex B of the 
Protocol’.51  
 
Similarly, the Swiss ETS defines emission allowances as ‘tradeable rights to emit greenhouse 
gases allocated by the Confederation or by states with emissions trading schemes recognised 
by the Federal Council’.52 
 
Perhaps the Kyoto Protocol started the trend of defining emission entitlements by their 
discrete qualities.  The Kyoto Protocol established the first ETS, in which states trade 
emission entitlements with each other. It begun by the UNFCCC allocating emission 
allowances, termed assigned amount units, to each developed party equal to their 
commitments.53 The UNFCCC defined assigned amount units as ‘A Kyoto unit representing 
an allowance to emit one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq)’.54  
 
The focus on the elements of an emission entitlement is, however, superficial because the 
approach does not legally classify the emission entitlements that people are trading or 
otherwise transferring within each scheme. For instance, holders of emission entitlements 
cannot be certain that they have ownership of their entitlements and if so, what rights (such as 
the right to exclude and transfer) are associated with their ownership. If the interest is less 
than full ownership, a question that remains is whether an entitlement contains in rem rights 
that attach to the entitlement and are exercisable against an indiscriminate class of people.  
Further issues include how these entitlements should be treated under other legislative 
                                                            
50 Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen [Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2 
Emissions] (Switzerland) date, SR 641.71 [Swiss Government translation];  
Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013. 
Environment Quality Act (Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission 
allowances) Q 2 r 46.1 2011, c1 (Quebec);  The Climate Change Mitigation and Low-Carbon Economy 
Act, O172 2016 (Ontario); Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, AR Reg Specified Gas 
Emitters Regulation 139/2007 (Alberta); Climate Change Response Act 2002 (New Zealand); Ley de 
Transición Energética[Energy Transition Act] (Mexico) 2015; California Cap on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms, 17 CA Adc T, Div 3, c 1 § 95802 (2013); 
Clean Air Rule, WAC CR-102 [Proposed Rule Making] (2016) (Washington); Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative 2013 (An agreement reached between Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and implemented into state laws); 
国家发展改革委关于印发《温室气体自愿减排交易管理暂行办法》的通知 [现行有效[Interim 
Measures for the Management of Voluntary GHG Emission Reduction Transactions] on [The Climate 
Group], 1668; Қазақстан Республикасының Экологиялық кодексі [Environmental Code of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 2007 No. 212] (Unofficial Translation by the Ministry of Justice of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Republican Center of Legal Information); 文書（流し込み [Tokyo 
Metropolitan Environmental Master Plan 2008]; [(할당) 및 온실 가스 배출 의 거래 에 관한 법률 
(GHG) 허가 , 법률 제 11419 , 2012] Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission 
(GHG) Permits, Act No. 11419, 2012.   
51 California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms, 17 CA 
Adc T, Div 3, c 1 § 95802 (2013) 
52 Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen [Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2 
Emissions] (Switzerland) date, SR 641.71 [Swiss Government translation] art 3.  
53 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature 11 December 1997, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998) 
(entered into force 16 February 2005) Annex B (Kyoto Protocol).  
54 Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual: On Accounting of Emissions and Assigned Amounts (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2008) 118.  
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schemes such as for taxation purposes, and whether derivative interests can be created and 
upheld.  
 
Beyond the descriptive specifications, three ETSs in our survey went further by characterising 
entitlements as administrative concessions, or at least stated that entitlements are not 
property.55 Four restricted the potential right of holders to divide interests in an entitlement.56 
The remaining 16 did not characterise emission entitlements beyond specifying the quantum 
of emissions they permitted. Accordingly, the approach to characterising emission 
entitlements can be divided into those ETSs that denied to varying extents the proprietary 
character of emission entitlements and those ETSs that remained silent as to the nature of the 
entitlements. 
 
Denial of Proprietary Character  
 
The three ETSs that characterised emission entitlements as not capable of supporting property 
rights were all US based.  For instance, the legislation that establishes California’s ETS states: 
‘No provision of this article may be construed to limit the authority of the Executive Officer 
to terminate or limit such authorization to emit. A compliance instrument [emission 
entitlement] issued by the Executive Officer does not constitute property or a property right 
(emphasis added)’.57 Likewise, the proposed bill for Washington’s ETS provides that 
emission reduction units ‘exist solely as an accounting mechanism and are not property 
rights’ and adds: ‘third parties to a transaction cannot ‘own’ any emission reduction units.58 
 
The rationale for characterising emission entitlements in this way corresponds with the 
comparatively higher level of property protection against regulatory interference in the US.59 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government from 
“taking” private property for public use without compensation. This clause has given rise to 
the doctrine of regulatory takings, which holds that the government must provide 
compensation where it enacts regulatory reforms that incidentally extinguish the economic 
value of person’s property right.60 The approach taken by US courts is to evaluate, among 
other things, the character of the government action and the economic impact of the 
regulation upon the claimant through diminution in the value of property.  
 
If an emission were characterised as property, an emission entitlement holder may be able to 
hold the US government liable for adjusting an ETS in a way that deprives a holder of some 
or all of the value of the entitlement. For example, a government decision to remove or alter 
the penalties that apply to emitters who do not have sufficient allowances would decrease the 
value of emission entitlements. This regulatory change may weaken the incentive of avoiding 
                                                            
55 These ETSs were established in California, Washington and through the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative 2013 (An agreement reached between Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and implemented into state laws). 
56 These ETSs were based in Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and New Zealand, and the relevant legislative 
instruments will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section.  
57 California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms, 17 CA 
Adc T, Div 3, c 1 § 95820  (2013).  
58 Clean Air Rule, WAC CR-102 [Proposed Rule Making] (2016) 173-442-120(1), 173-442-140(3), 
173-442-120(1).  
59 See, generally, Tom Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 162–165.  
60Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 US 635, 642 (1879). See also, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal 
Council 112 Supreme Court 2886 (1992);  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los 
Angeles 482 US 304 (1987); Lingle v Chevron 544 US 528. 
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a penalty by purchasing allowances, and therefore diminish the value of the entitlements.61  
The value of emissions allowance may also be affected by the introduction of command-and-
control regulation that makes cleaner technologies and processes mandatory.62  Alternatively, 
a government may increase the ratio of allowances required to offset one tonne of emissions, 
alter the verification methods or lower the overall cap on emissions.63 These regulatory 
actions could in turn affect the value of entitlements. Finally, the government may alter the 
rights attached to allowances such as by restricting imports or exports of emission allowances 
in a way that reduces the worth of the allowances.64  
 
Although denying the proprietary nature of emission entitlement clarifies the relationship 
between the government and the holder in relation to the entitlement, it also aggravates legal 
uncertainties. As Cole observed in respect of US legislation governing tradeable entitlements 
for air pollution ‘It provides that an emission allowance is not “a property right” but expressly 
recognizes property rights in emission allowances’.65  Cole is referring to the fact that, even 
where the proprietary nature of an entitlement is denied, rights are still granted in relation to 
an entitlement that are proprietary in nature including a limited right to transfer and hold 
emission entitlements. Ultimately, denying that an entitlement is property is, as Cole 
observed, ‘premised on the confusion between property rights in something and the thing 
itself’. 66   This is because an entitlement in itself is not property but the rights in relation to 
the entitlement can be property in nature, that is, in rem, so declaring an entitlement to not be 
property does not declare the rights in the entitlement as not proprietary in nature.  
 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2013, which is an agreement reached between nine 
US states to establish a ETS, is illustrative of the confusion that surrounds entitlements when 
they function as market instruments but are not capable of supporting property interests. The 
model rules for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative provides that emission allowances do 
not constitute a property right.67 However, the Model Rules also refers to “ownership 
interests” in emission allowances, and defines an “owner” as ‘any holder of any portion of the 
legal or equitable title in a CO2 budget unit’ as well as ‘any person who has an ownership 
interest with respect to the CO2 allowances held in the general account and who is …. the 
CO2 authorized account representative to represent that person’s ownership interest with 
respect to the CO2 allowances’.68 Arguably, the cognitive dissonance illustrated in these 
provisions stems from the drafters desire to maintain the regulatory space governments 
                                                            
61 In such situations, the monetary benefits associated with reducing emissions to obtain tradeable 
allowances are weakened, as companies that may otherwise have purchased the allowances have to 
employ emissions-reducing technologies and processes. Furthermore, the market for emission 
allowances may be over-supplied if a substantial group of entities reduced their emissions.  
62 Henry A Span, ‘Of TEAs and Takings: Compensation Guarantees for Confiscated Tradeable 
Environmental Allowances’ (2000) 109(8) The Yale Law Journal 1983, 1990. 
63 See, eg, Yvonne F Lindgren, ‘Emissions Trading Policy: Smoke on the Horizon for Takings Clause 
Claimants, The’ (1990) 18 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 667 where the author outlined a 
situation where a regulator adopted amendments that reduced by eighty per cent the value of emission 
reduction credits leaving one emission allowance holder with 20 credits as opposed to the 100 they held 
before the regulatory amendment. 
64 The import or export of emission allowances is part of linking ETS schemes. This example comes 
from, Michael Power, 'Emissions Trading in Australia: Markets, law and justice under the CPRS' 
(2010) 27 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 131, 147. 
65 Daniel Cole, ‘Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental 
Protection’ (1999) 10(1) Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 103, 113. 
66 Ibid 114. 
67 Model Rules (Part XX C02 Budget Trading Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) 1.5(c)(9) 
‘Standard Requirements’ < 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview/_FinalProgramReviewMaterials/Model_Rule_FINAL.pdf> .  
68 Ibid 1.2 (bj) ‘Definitions’.  
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require to adjust entitlements for public and environmental policy goals with the reality that 
ETSs rely on a functioning market with tradeable assets.  
 
 In comparison to the approach taken by US legislatures, the legislation establishing 
Australia’s ETS, which is now retracted, designated carbon units as ‘personal property’.69  
The constitutional context in Australia is a key point of distinction driving the different 
classifications of emission entitlements between the US and Australia. The Australian 
Constitution guarantees the acquisition of property on “just terms”, but merely “taking” of 
private property is not significant enough to be a constitutional breach. Furthermore, the High 
Court of Australia has adopted a “gains” approach to acquisitions that occur because of 
legislative enactments or change.70 This means the Australian government must acquire ‘a 
corresponding benefit of commensurate value’ from depriving the plaintiff of their property in 
order for the constitutional guarantee to operate.71  
 
In cases where the Australian regulator, for instance, alters an ETS, the government does not 
acquire the lost commercial value of the entitlement, and so is unlikely to be liable. Similarly, 
if the Australian government extinguished an entitlement, they arguably have not “gained” an 
interest or other benefit because the property no longer exists. Moreover, Australian courts 
have tended to find that compensation is not required where the government acquires 
proprietary interests that are statutory in nature because such interests are ‘inherently 
susceptible to modification’ by the parliament.72 In contrast to the US then, regulatory 
adjustments to an ETS in Australia are less likely to result in the government being liable. 
Accordingly, Australian legislatures and courts have been more willing than their US 
counterparts to recognise statutory entitlements as property. The comparison of the two 
countries illustrates the ways in which constitutional context can shape legal characterisations 
of entitlements, leading to a fragmented understanding of the legal nature of entitlements.  
 
As an alternative to expressly denying or acknowledging the proprietary nature of an emission 
entitlement, four of the ETSs examined placed limitations on the rights conferred with an 
entitlement. For instance, the legislation establishing Ontario’s ETS prohibits the division of 
title where it states: ‘No registered participant shall hold in the participant’s cap and trade 
accounts an emission allowance or credit that is owned, directly or indirectly, by another 
person…’.73 Similarly, Quebec’s ETS states: ‘An emitter or a participant may only hold 
emission allowances for their own use and not on behalf of another person having an interest 
in or control the emission allowances’.74 Although Quebec has protections for private 
property rights, the history of Canadian courts finding fishing licences to be divisible in spite 
of statutory prohibitions on transfers may have more directly influenced these restrictions on 
divisibility.75  
 
                                                            
69 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 103. This Act was repealed on the 17 July 2014 by the Clean Energy 
Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014 (Cth).  
70 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 145 (Mason J). Ostler described the approach as a 
‘gains’ approach. See, Duane Ostler, ‘Gain as Loss: The High Court’s Approach in Regulatory 
Acquisition Cases’ (2015) 26(1) Bond Law Review 66. 
71 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 79 CLR 155, 223 (McHugh J). 
72 Minister for Primary Industry and Energy v Davey (1993) 47 FCR 151, 172-173 (Burchett J); Health 
Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ; McHugh); 
Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1994) 179 CLR 297 (Mason 
CJ and Deane and Gaudron JJ).  
73 The Climate Change Mitigation and Low-Carbon Economy Act, O172 2016 s 28(2) 
74  Environment Quality Act (Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission 
allowances) Q 2 r 46.1 2011, c1 s 24. 
75 See, eg, Saulnier (Receiver of) v Saulnier (2006) 241 NSR (2d) 96 (NS Sup Ct). Note, Quebec’s 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, Q 1982, c-12 art 6. Ontario does not enshrine a human right 
to property.  
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New Zealand also states that a unit recorded in its registry is ‘[i]ndivisible with respect to the 
issue, holding, transfer, retirement, replacement, surrender, carry-over, cancellation, and 
conversion of a unit within the unit register’.76  To put this restriction in context, New Zealand 
legislatures have been cautious in drafting statutory entitlements, with the result that New 
Zealand has a range of expressly transferable and expressly non-transferable entitlements.77 
 
Significantly, these restrictions on the divisibility of rights under an entitlement may prevent a 
finding that a particular emission entitlement is capable of supporting proprietary rights. This 
is because the assignability, that is, the right to transfer, has typically formed an important 
part of property analysis to varying degrees. For instance, US and Canadian courts, and to a 
lesser extent Australian courts, have emphasised the transferability and value of a statutory 
entitlement when determining whether it is capable of being subject to property rights.78  
Silence as to Legal Character  
 
The 16 remaining ETSs examined declined to define emissions allowance by reference to 
either the concepts of property or administrative authorisations.  These schemes leave the 
relationship between the government and the holder of an emission entitlement unclear, as 
well as the rights of third-parties in relation to an entitlement. An example is the European 
Union’s (EU) ETS, which is the first and largest regional emissions trading program for 
greenhouse gases, and so has been particularly influential on the development of domestic and 
regional ETSs.  
 
In line with most other ETS, the EU ETS limits the nature of emissions allowances to the bare 
minimum components. Commission Regulation No. 389/2013 states that ‘An 
allowance…shall be fungible, dematerialised instrument that is tradeable on the market’.79 
Because of this broad definition, some EU member countries have characterised EU emission 
allowances as intangible financial instruments, while other EU Members characterised them 
as tradable commodities and tangible assets.80  
 
Although most ETSs are silent as to the legal nature of emission entitlements, all the ETSs 
examined had established an online registry to record, hold and transfer entitlements. The 
development and administration of online registries appears to be the main method for 
fostering market confidence and legal certainty without specifying the rights and duties that 
could exist in entitlements. From one perspective then, a registry system could contribute to a 
clearer characterisation of emission entitlements.  The registries could function in a way 
analogous to most trademark and patent registration systems, whereby a register accurately 
and completely reflects ownership and other interests to the extent that the registration is 
prima facie proof of an interest.81 The EU ETS seems to have adopted an analogous approach 
with its registry. EU Directive 389/2013 provides that a title to an emission allowance is 
established by its ‘existence in the account of the Union Registry in which they are held’, and 
                                                            
76 Climate Change Response Act 2002 (NZ) s 18(3). 
77 See, eg, Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) s 122; Public Works Act 1981 (NZ) prt 2; cf Fisheries 
Act 1996 (NZ) prt 15A.  
78 Some key cases that emphasised transferability include the Canadian case of Taylor v Dairy Farmers 
of Nova Scotia (2010) 298 NSR (2d) 116; The US case of Peanut Quota Holders Association Inc v 
United States (‘Peanut Quota Holders’) 421 F 3d 1323, 1331 [6] (Fed Cir, 2005); and Australian 
Capital Territory v Pinter (2002) 121 FCR 509.  
79 Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 art 40(1) 
80 Matthieu Wemaere, Charlotte Streck and Thiago Chagas, ‘Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto 
Units and EU Allowances’ in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon 
Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2009) 35, 51. 
81 Commerce and Trade, 15 USC § 1115 (2002).  
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if a party registers a transfer of an entitlement to another it cannot be ‘reversed, revoked or 
unwound’.82  
 
However, Low and Lin have argued that ‘Registration Systems serve as records of rights. 
They do not represent the rights themselves. It is thus not strictly accurate to state that “an 
European Union Allowance exists only in electronic form”. It is an inconclusive record that 
exists in electronic form’.83 Assuming that an emission entitlement registry does not represent 
the rights themselves, Low and Lin suggest that registration alone will not validate 
unauthorised transfers, and a recent court case confirmed this.84 In line with this perspective 
on the function of registration systems, the majority of the ETSs examined constructed their 
registries more as evidence of an interest rather than a manifestation of the interest.85  
Consequently, registries are a source of evidence for arguing that particular interests exist in 
an entitlement, but are limited in their ability to provide an authoritative legal source of the 
nature and scope of rights available in an entitlement.
                                                            
82 Commission Regulation 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry [2013] OJ L 122/1, 
art 40(1). 
83 Low and Lin, above n 34, 15. 
84 Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch).   
85See, eg, 国家发展改革委关于印发《温室气体自愿减排交易管理暂行办法》的通知 [现行有效
[Interim Measures for the Management of Voluntary GHG Emission Reduction Transactions] on [The 
Climate Group], 1668. Article 7 appoints particular departments to ‘establish and manage the register 
of voluntary emission reduction transactions’ for the registering of offset projects and emission 
reductions and to ‘keep detailed records of the basic information on projects and the relevant 
information on the filing, trading and cancellation of emission reductions’.  
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IV. Limitations of current approaches to characterising emission 
entitlements: What is left unspecified and unregulated if emission 
entitlements are not “property”?  
 
 
One way to characterise an entitlement is as a revocable licence, created by an exercise of 
administrative power under statute. This description may clarify the relationship between the 
government and the entitlement holder in relation to the entitlement, but it does not explain 
the relationship between a holder and third parties in respect to an emission entitlement or 
how emission entitlements should be dealt with under other areas of law. It remains unclear, 
across the spectrum of approaches, whether an entity can own an interest in an entitlement or 
the other types of interest that can be created, what rights accompany ownership and other 
kinds of interests, how long these rights last and who they are exercisable against. 
 
In this section, we consider in more depth the private law issues that could arise or have 
occurred in relation to emission entitlements. For reasons of scope, we have focused on cases 
from common law countries where the legal characterisation of an entitlement formed a 
central part of the dispute. By referring to case law in relation to other kinds of statutory-
based entitlements, such as fishing permits or mining licences, we are able to explore the key 
issues that arise where the nature of an entitlement is unclear and analyse how courts have 
tended to resolve such issues. Thus, case law concerning other types of statutory-based 
entitlements is instructive of the kinds of issues legislatures and other regulators need to 
consider when characterising entitlements, and how courts are likely to respond to particular 
drafting and specification techniques.  
 
We have found that disputes centring on the nature of an entitlement tend to fall into one of 
three categories. The first category of cases concern whether or not an entitlement is regulated 
by another statute that deals with the transfer of property such as bankruptcy, insolvency, 
partnership, and succession laws. In the second category are those cases concerned with the 
application of legal or equitable property doctrines between private parties.86 The third 
category consists of cases where the transfer of an entitlement has occurred even though the 
relevant statutory regime either prohibits transfers or the parties have not satisfied statutory 
conditions for transfer.  
Category 1:  Determining the effect of statutes dealing with proprietary 
interests 
As the previous part illustrated, legislative instruments establishing ETS are generally silent 
in relation to how the emission entitlements will interact with other statutes. Fortunately, 
common law courts have considered the effect of a broad range of statutes on an entitlement 
created by a different legislative instrument. Such matters tend to revolve around whether a 
particular entitlement comes within the definition of “property” provided by another statute. 
Particular statutory entitlements have been found to fulfil the definition of “property” in the 
relevant statutes for the purposes of: assignment to a trustee during personal bankruptcy,87 
division of relationship or matrimonial property,88 taxation,89 and writs of executions.90 
                                                            
86 Sharon A Christensen et al, ‘Statutory Licences and Third Party Dealings: Property Analysis v 
Statutory Interpretation’ (2015) 2015(4) New Zealand Law Review 585, 587. 
87  See, eg, Re Rae [1995] BCC 102 (Ch) where it was held that a fishing licence should be considered 
part of the bankrupt’s estate; PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. and Gaudet et al., 2012 NBCA 85. 
88 Swanson v Swanson [1999] 1 NZLR 19 (CA); Fearnley v Fearnley [1997] NZFLR 609.  
89 F.A.S. Seafood Producers Ltd. v. Her Majesty the Queen 98 DTC 2034. 
90 Stout & Co LLP v Chez Outdoors 2009 ABQB 444. 
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For instance, courts have considered whether a statutory entitlement is “partnership property” 
for the purposes of the relevant partnership legislation. Handrigan J of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Supreme Court in Tremblett v Tremblett found that a fishing licence used by two 
brothers in a fishing enterprise was partnership property.91  Handrigan J focused on the 
substantial fees the brothers paid for the licence and the fact that it allowed the brothers to run 
a lucrative business, so the licence was “something more” than ‘mere permission’.92 
Likewise, Yam J of the High Court of Hong Kong found that a licence to conduct a bus 
service business, which was not transferable under the relevant statute, was “partnership 
property” within the relevant statute.93  
 
Another example is where an entitlement holder becomes insolvent. In such cases a court 
must consider whether an entitlement is “property” that can be distributed by the liquidator in 
line with the relevant insolvency statute. In Re Celtic Extraction Ltd, for example, two 
companies that held waste management licences under the Environmental Protection Act 
1990 became insolvent.94 The companies were put into compulsory liquidation, and the court 
had to determine whether the waste management licences were “property” within the meaning 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 despite the fact that the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
prohibits the transfer of such licences. Neuberger J observed ‘Although section 35(10) of the 
1990 Act provides that a waste management licence is not transferable by the holder, it does 
not govern what would happen on an insolvency or affect the operation of the [Insolvency Act 
1986]’.95  
 
In a similar vein, courts have found entitlements, from milk quotas and nursing home licences 
to taxicab licences and fishing permits, are forms of intangible property, which can be 
encumbered under securities legislation and security agreements.96 In fact, New Zealand’s 
Personal Property Securities Act expressly incorporates emission entitlements as personal 
property that can be subject to security interests, despite the fact that New Zealand’s ETS 
prohibits parties from dividing their interests in an entitlement.97  
 
Observing this trend in the case law concerning statutory entitlements, the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Saulnier v Royal Bank of Canada observed: ‘Even in the “regulatory cases” the 
courts now … consider traditional common law notions of property as less of a stumbling 
block to recognition of licences and quotas as “property” for statutory purposes’.98  
Accordingly, emission entitlements are more likely to be considered property for the purposes 
of other statutes which regulate transfers of property, at least as far as common law 
jurisdictions are concerned.  
                                                            
91 Tremblett v Tremblett 2012 NLTD 166, 329 Nfld & PEIR 26, [91]. 
92 Ibid [67] citing Saulnier v Royal Bank of Canada [2008] 3 S.C.R. 166, 2008 SCC 58. 
93 Yau Wah Hing v Yuen Kay Ming HKCA CACV 46/2012,19 Mar 2013, [2013] HKEC 399, [33]. 
94 Re Celtic Extraction Ltd [2001] Ch 475 (CA) 
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Category 2: Applicability of legal and equitable property doctrines  
 
For the purposes of resolving private disputes where the statute is unclear, common law 
courts have tended to refer to legal and equitable property doctrines.99 This reliance on legal 
or equitable property doctrines, despite the distinct nature of statutory entitlements, is partly 
due to the fact that the relevant ETS statutes have not provided cause of actions. Thus, courts 
are left to determine by analogy whether entitlement is “property” within the pre-existing 
property categories in common law, to identify whether a relevant cause of action is 
established. Alternatively, courts could find that emission entitlements are not “property” and 
therefore are not subject to legal or equitable property doctrines. Yet, such an approach is not 
favourable from a policy perspective, given the significant commercial value of particular 
statutory entitlements and the need for market confidence so ETSs can function.  
 
The key case in this area is Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd in which 
Morris J of the High Court of England and Wales held that European Union Allowances 
(EUAs) grant holders rights in intangible property, which is therefore capable of supporting 
equitable claims.100 In this case, Armstrong stored EUAs in accounts on the German registry. 
An unknown third-party used an email fraud scheme to obtain Armstrong’s account username 
and password. The third-party then sold to Winnington 21000 of Armstrong’s EUAs. 
Winnington, who was unaware of the fraudulent activity, on sold the EUAs to another 
company for €272,500. Armstrong sought relief against Winnington in relation to the 21000 
EUAs.  
 
The issue before the court was conventional: who should bear the loss for fraud? The novel 
question to resolve concerned the legal classification of EUAs. Both Armstrong and 
Winnington agreed that EUAs constituted ‘a property right of some sort’, but they disputed 
the nature of EUAs including whether EUAs were the type of “property” that could be subject 
to Armstrong’s claims for equitable or proprietary relief.101 As Morris J in Armstrong v 
Winnington observed ‘Where the property in question is goods, the matter is covered by the 
law of conversion and the principles are relatively clear. However, where the property in 
question is a chose in action or some other intangible property, the position is less clear’.102  
 
In reaching his decision regarding the nature of EUAs, Morris J applied the Ainsworth test 
and found that EUAs were: definable as they represented ‘the sum total of rights and 
entitlements conferred on a holder pursuant to an ETS’, identifiable by third parties as each 
entitlement is described account using a unique reference number, transferable as the ETS 
allows the transfer of EUAs, and permanent and stable as they continue in accounts until they 
are transferred to the state or another party.103  
 
His Honour then considered the categories of property that exist in English law, and in 
particular the threefold test developed by Morrit LJ in Re Celtic for determining whether a 
statutory entitlement should be categorised as intangible property. To be intangible property, 
the test provides that:  
 
First, there must be a statutory framework conferring an entitlement on one who 
satisfies certain conditions even though there is some element of discretion 
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exercisable within that framework. Second, the exemption must be transferable. 
Third, the exemption or licence will have value.104 
 
Returning to emission entitlements under the EU ETS, Morris J held that each of these 
elements were met by EUAs as they are conferred by the statutory scheme establishing the 
EU’s ETS; they are transferable as provided in relevant instruments; and EUAs are 
exemptions and as such they have value to those who must comply with the cap on 
emissions.105 In doing so, his Honour conceptualised emission entitlements not as rights to 
emit that can be enforced through private actions but as exemptions from being fined by the 
state regulator.106  
 
However, Morris J did not consider EUAs compatible with the pre-existing categories for 
intangible property, which are choses in action and choses in possession. His Honour’s 
reasoning was based on the fact that “chose in possession” only applies to things that can be 
possessed like a physical title to the EUA, and “chose in action” only applies to those types of 
property that can only be recovered through action.107 As the legal nature of allowances was 
proprietary, EUAs were capable of supporting equitable interests. Thus, Morris J held that the 
fraudulent party held the EUAs as trustee for Armstrong, and Winnington received property 
that was already subject to a pre-existing trust.108 
 
Armstrong v Winnington is useful because it directly considers the legal character of emission 
entitlements, and illustrates the difficulties that courts face when determining legal actions 
concerning entitlements where their legal classification is unclear.  If the court did not find a 
way to adapt legal actions to this novel form of property, Armstrong would have relied on the 
grounds of unjust enrichment to receive restitution.109 However, this claim might have been 
unsuccessful as Winnington paid for the EUAs, so it would be difficult to establish that 
Winnington had been unjustly “enriched”.110 Further, Morris J observed that ‘[a] claim in 
unjust enrichment is only generally available where the benefit has been provided directly by the 
claimant to the defendant, and not where it has been provided indirectly via a third party’.111 
Arguably then, finding that EUAs could be the subject matter of a trust was critical for ensuring 
that the harm caused by the fraud did not fall on the fraud victim, Armstrong.  
 
Given that the rights that make up a EUA were capable of being divided in Armstrong v 
Winnington, the case supports the view that third-party participants can obtain interests in 
EUAs including therefore security interests. The validity and enforceability of such interests 
is particularly important for traders of derivatives in emission allowances. Nevertheless, 
Armstrong v Winnington does not provide a precise delineation of the rights that make up 
emission entitlements, the ways in which third-party interests can be created in an entitlement 
nor how to balance the public interest objectives of ETSs with these rights. 
 
Category 3: Dispositions of entitlements despite prohibitions or unfulfilled 
conditions  
 
The legislative instruments establishing ETSs in Quebec, Alberta, Ontario, Washington and 
New Zealand prohibit a holder from dividing their interest in an emission entitlement. More 
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generally, ETSs impose conditions on transfer such as that it must be evidenced in a registry. 
The relevant legislative instruments do not explain the effect on the transfer where a holder 
disposes of an interest where they are prohibited to do so or where a condition of transfer is 
unfilled. However, some guidance can be found from decisions of courts in common law 
concerning transfers of statutory entitlements in spite of prohibitions or conditions.  
 
Generally, courts in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK have read down restrictions 
or conditions on transfers to apply only to transfers in legal title.112 In other words, a statutory 
entitlement could pass in equity where the transfer does not meet statutory requirements 
because these conditions in the statute only apply to transfers in law. For instance, R Baker 
Fisheries Ltd v Widrig concerned a clam fishing licence that could only be held by someone 
who used the licence to personally fish.113 Baker transferred his licence and equipment to 
Widrig so that Widrig could legally fish for clams while using his own boat.  Widrig would 
sell all the clams he harvested to Baker to sell. Two written agreements revealed that the 
parties intended for Widrig to receive a limited right to fish under the licence while Baker 
retained property in the licence.114  After the business relationship broke down, Widrig 
refused to return or pay for the licence. Baker commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court 
of Nova Scotia seeking equitable remedies including specific performance and an account of 
profits.115   
 
Haliburton J focused on the contractual terms reached between the parties and  described the 
effect of the agreement as follows:  ‘It was understood and agreed by and between the parties 
that beneficial ownership of the clam fishing licence belonged to Baker’.116 His Honour also 
noted that, even though the transfer of licences was not contemplated under the relevant 
statute, it was customary to transfer licences in equity within the fishing industry.117 
Ultimately, the orders sought by Baker were granted.118  
 
Similar reasoning was adopted in Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd, which concerned whether a 
milk quota, could be held on trust even though it was only a right to be exempt from 
particular taxes and could only attach to a land holding on which milk was produced.119 Jacob 
J observed that a ‘Quota has commercial value and a legal effect. Merely because there are 
limitations on how it may be held or conveyed is not a reason for equity to refuse to impose a 
trust where conscience so requires’.120 The fact that the quota was required to attach to land 
that produced milk meant that the trustee of the quota must hold milk producing land and 
must deal with the land in a way compliant with the trust. Thus, Jacob J concluded: ‘But that 
is a consequence of becoming a trustee, not a reason for equity to say there cannot be a 
trust’.121  
 
The body of case law suggests that restrictions on transfers or conditions on holding an 
entitlement will not necessarily be effective. Courts have illustrated a preference for 
upholding commercial arrangements and expectations by utilising equitable remedies than 
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enforcing without flexibility statutory restrictions or requirements. Whether a similar 
approach would be adopted in relation to emission entitlements is difficult to determine, 
especially given the wording of the restrictions. For instance, the Ontario legislative 
framework provides that ‘An emitter or a participant may only hold emission allowances for 
their own use and not on behalf of another person having an interest in or control the 
emission allowances (emphasis added)’.  This seems to be a more direct, expressed restriction 
on transfers in equity, and so courts may not be able to rely on the reasoning that the statute 
impliedly allowed transfers in equity.  
 
Yet, there are cases that illustrate how, by distinguishing between contractual and proprietary 
rights, courts are able to uphold transfers in equity or in law even where it is prohibited. 122  
Even if a statute specifically restricts transfers in law and equity, like the Ontario example in 
the previous paragraph, the restriction may be interpreted as allowing third parties to hold 
contractual rights in respect of an entitlement.  
 
A useful example is Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd, where the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia considered the effect of a statutory clause that prohibited for a 
year the transfer legal and equitable interests in exploration licences without Ministerial 
approval.123 The Court held that the prohibition applied to proprietary transfers but does not 
affect the validity of personal rights that arise under contractual dealings with an exploration 
licence.124 In relation to emission entitlements then, courts may reason that personal rights in 
an entitlement arising from a contract are still enforceable against another party to the 
contract even if the transfer of proprietary rights in an entitlement was not effective due to 
being in beach of the relevant statute.   
 
In line with this reasoning, common law courts have drawn a distinction between the 
breaching of a statutory provision and its effects on a transfer of statutorily created rights. The 
High Court of Australia in Gnych v Polish Club recently held that a breach of a prohibition in 
a statute does not necessarily invalidate a contractual arrangement that came about by the 
parties breaching the relevant statute.125 Subsequently, dealings with an entitlement that are in 
breach of the relevant statute may not automatically invalidate the transfer. Perhaps more 
importantly though, this body of case law illustrates how private parties will deal with a 
statutory entitlement in a way that suits their business models and objectives regardless of 
statutory limitations.  
V. MOVING TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM  
 
Parties to the Paris Agreement agreed to develop the ‘rules, modalities and procedures for the 
mechanism’ for the Sustainable Development Mechanism at the next meeting of the 
parties.126At this stage, it is clear the mechanism will encompass private and public actors and 
will allow states to transfer emission reductions, that is, “internationally transferred mitigation 
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outcomes”, resulting from projects in another state. 127 The Sustainable Development 
mechanism may ultimately establish a global market for emission entitlements, which is 
perhaps implied in the agreement as one of the mechanism’s goals is ‘To deliver an overall 
mitigation in global emissions’.128 Conversely, domestic political opposition to ETSs presents 
a major challenge for developing domestic let alone international ETSs, as reflected in 
Australia’s withdrawal of its ETS. Pearse suggests that: ‘The Paris Agreement will not deliver 
a carbon market that comes even close to the ideal trading regime economists have been after. 
What we are likely to see after Paris is a patchwork of emissions trading and offsets 
schemes’.129  
 
Whether a global ETS emerges or ETSs continue to be developed from the bottom-up, the 
characterisation of emission entitlements will have relevance, because it can affect modes of 
dealing with entitlements, market viability and liquidity as well as the potential for inter-
linking schemes. International agreement on the scope and nature of emission entitlements 
would be beneficial for increasing the compatibility between ETSs and improving the 
functioning of emission markets, regardless of the way in which ETSs ultimately develop.  
The development of rules for the Sustainable Development Mechanism by the parties to the 
Paris Agreement, presents a useful avenue to better harmonise the legal nature of emission 
entitlements.  
 
It is our suggestion then that parties establish standards to guide legislative drafters on issues 
to consider and address in relation to the legal nature of emission entitlements, whether 
through standard setting for the Sustainable Development Mechanism or otherwise. Such 
standards could structure the discretion of legislatures and other regulators in a way that 
accommodates different constitutional contexts, as well as safeguard against legislatures 
overlooking the legal nature of emission entitlements when creating or implementing ETSs.  
 
The setting of international standards for statutorily created rights would not be a new legal 
development. For example, the International Agreement on Trade-Related Property Rights 
(TRIPS) provides functional specifications for the legal rules dealing with legislatively-
created intellectual property rights.130 Article 28 states that: 
 
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not 
having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing for these purposes that product; 
2.  Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent 
and to conclude licensing contracts. 
 
In the context of emission entitlements, similar exclusive rights to prevent third-party 
interference and the ability to transfer an entitlement through succession would be beneficial. 
Additional provisions could require that legislatures consider and clarify the ways in which 
emission entitlements interact with the broader domestic legal framework. 
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Another potential model is the United Nations Convention on Contracts, which identifies the 
rights and obligations of parties transnationally trading in goods.131 For instance, Article 42 
provides that:   
 
The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or claim of a third party 
based on industrial property or other intellectual property, of which at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been unaware, provided 
that the right or claim is based on industrial property or other intellectual property:  
 
(a) under the law of the State where the goods will be resold or otherwise used, if it 
was contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract that the 
goods would be resold or otherwise used in that State; or  
(b) in any other case, under the law of the State where the buyer has his place of 
business. 
 
Article 42 guides regulators and trading parties in relation to standards for liability and choice 
of law rules for resolving disputes. As far as informing the development of ETSs though, the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts is limited by its focus on the relationship between 
two parties. In other words, it seeks to clarify in personam rights. Therefore, it does not 
consider alternative modes of dealing with entitlements or the ways in which domestic legal 
regimes interact with entitlements.  
 
In addition to a standards-based instrument, the World Bank’s Doing Business index is an 
example of an additional way in which standards could be developed in relation to ETSs 
generally, and the nature of entitlements and registries in particular.  The World Bank’s 
Doing Business project assesses countries’ commercial legal frameworks against select 
indicators in order to encourage more efficient regulation.132  For instance, the project 
evaluates land administration systems based on whether registries: provide accurate, public 
information on interests, adequately verify interests before registration and create avenues for 
third parties to access compensation where they engaged in a transaction based on false 
information certified by the registry.133 In the context of emission entitlements, a similar index 
could be developed for ranking ETSs, which could encompass standards for the stability and 
clarity of rights in entitlements as well as the ways in which registries function to transfer and 
protect these rights.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
ETSs are still in a relatively early stage of their development with many states not 
participating in such schemes yet. The literature has tended to focus on the significant 
verification issues in ETSs while government bodies either have overlooked the 
characterisation of entitlements or have characterised them in a manner designed to prevent 
claims against government for regulatory takings. As a result, the legal character of emission 
entitlements is a relatively understudied and insufficiently regulated gap in current ETSs. To 
promote the functioning of markets for emissions, and therefore to facilitate the objective of 
reducing emissions, legislatures should delineate the rights and liabilities that attach to an 
entitlement and the modes of dealing that are permitted. The scoping of interests capable of 
existing in relation to an emission entitlement will be difficult given the varying constitutional 
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contexts and the unique nature of emission entitlements as a public policy instrument and 
private asset.  In light of the Paris Agreement, an international standard-setting exercise for 
characterising emission entitlements would be beneficial as ETSs become more globally 
integrated and complex.  
 
